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ABSTRACTS OF RECENT CASES
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Abstractor
Arrest, Search and Seizure-Woug Sui v.
United States, 83 Sup. Ct. 407 (1963). See Con-
fessions, infra.
Arrest, Search and Seizure-Hurst v. California,
211 F. Supp. 387 (N.D. Cal. 1962). Petitioner
was convicted of possession of narcotics in a Cali-
fornia state court. On petition for writ of habeas
corpus, petitioner contended that he was convicted
on the basis of illegally seized evidence. The
District Court issued the writ and ordered peti-
tioner's discharge from custody, holding that
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, abstracted at 52
J. Cmn. L., C. & P.S. 292 (1961), decided after
petitioner's conviction, must be given retroactive
effect because of the constitutional nature of the
decision; that Mapp required not only that ille-
gally seized evidence be excluded by state courts
but also that federal standards be used to deter-
mine whether the contested evidence was illegally
seized; that although prior California decisions
permitted a search without a warrant followed by
a valid arrest to be deemed incident to the arrest
in order to uphold its validity, the federal law
demanding that a valid arrest precede a search
without a warrant before the search could be
found valid as incident to arrest must now be
applied in determining the legality of seizure of
evidence sought to be admitted in California
state courts; that applying this federal test, the
evidence complained of was seized illegally where
the arrest which preceded it was invalid, since it
was a "fruit" of a prior warrantless search which
followed no arrest; and, finally, that habeas corpus
would lie to effect petitioner's release where the
judgment of conviction rested on illegally seized
evidence.
Arrest, Search and Seizure-United States v.
Tate, 209 F. Supp. 762 (D. Del. 1962). Defendant
was convicted of possessing a sawed-off shotgun
on which the federal tax had not been paid as re-
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quired by 26 U.S.C. §5821 (1958). On timely
motion, after verdict, for judgment of acquittal,
defendant contended that the shotgun admitted
against him was obtained as the result of a search
and seizure which violated his Fourth Amendment
rights. The District Court granted defendant's
motion, holding that where a Delaware State
Highway Trooper, having arrested defendant
without a warrant for speeding following a 100
mile an hour chase and subsequent resistance by
defendant, handcuffed him and placed him inside
the police car and then proceeded to search de-
fendant's car, the search was unlawful as a general,
exploratory search, because the trooper could not
have been looking for fruits of the crime, since the
crime of speeding has no fruits, or for weapons
which might aid defendant to escape, since he was
secured in the trooper's car; and hence the shot-
gun, which was found under the front seat of
defendant's car during the search and which was
the basis of his conviction, should have been ex-
cluded as evidence at his trial, and the conviction
therefore could not stand.
Arrest, Search and Seizure-Moore v. State,
146 So. 2d 734 (Ala. App. 1962). Petitioner was
convicted of robbery in 1952. On appeal from the
Circuit Court's denial of his application for habeas
corpus, petitioner contended that his conviction
was based on evidence obtained by unlawful arrest
and illegal search and seizure. Noting that no
state or federal decision prevented conviction
brought about by illegal search and seizure in
1952, the Court of Appeals of Alabama affirmed,
holding that Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, ab-
stracted at 52 J. CRrM. L., C. & P.S. 292 (1961),
had no retrospective effect in Alabama. (The
Court cited Petition of Dirring, 183 N.E.2d 300
(Mass. 1962), abstracted at 54 J. CRIer. L., C. &
P.S. 83 (1963), as authority for its holding; such
reliance appears ill-advised, since Dirring was de-
cided on procedural grounds without regard to
whether Mapp was retroactive.)
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Arrest, Search and Seizure-Schaffer v. Slate,
184 A.2d 689 (Del. 1962). Defendants were con-
victed of third degree burglary. On appeal, de-
fendants contended that since police custody is
inherently coercive, defendants could not as a
matter of law have authorized by voluntary con-
sent the otherwise unreasonable search and seizure
which produced evidence used against them. The
Supreme Court of Delaware affirmed, holding that
the rationale that consent to search or seizure as a
matter of law cannot be given by one in police
custody would not be followed in Delaware, be-
cause such a holding "would seriously jeopardize
police inquiry and investigation long considered
both lawful and necessary"; and that where there
was evidence that a $20 bill was voluntarily pro-
duced by defendant Schaffer, the trial court
properly "tentatively" admitted it into evidence
with appropriate instructions which left to the
jury the ultimate determination of consent to the
search and seizure.
Arrest, Search and Seizure-Beale v. State, 186
A.2d 213 (Md. 1962). Defendant was convicted,
as a second offender, of unlawful possession of
narcotics and equipment for administering nar-
cotics. On appeal, defendant contended that
narcotics equipment admitted against her, which
was taken from the back yard of the house in which
she lived, was obtained by means of an illegal
search and seizure. The Court of Appeals of Mary-
land reversed and remanded, holding that where
defendant threw the equipment from her second
story apartment into the yard because of actions
of the police officers in attempting to enter her
apartment without a warrant, seizure of the equip-
ment by Officer Davis, who was then trespassing
in the yard, was illegal; that when Officer Robin-
son forcibly entered defendant's apartment be-
cause of information from Officer Davis that
defendant was or had been committing a mis-
demeanor, Robinson too became a trespasser,
since Davis discovered the information while
trespassing; and that even if defendant's arrest
without a warrant was lawful, the seizure could
not be deemed lawful as incident thereto, since it
preceded arrest.
Arrest, Search and Seizure-State v. Goff, 118
N.W.2d 625 (Neb. 1962). Defendant was con-
victed of unlawful possession of narcotic drugs and
was sentenced as an habitual criminal. On appeal,
defendant contended that the trial court erred in
failing to grant his motion to suppress evidence
unlawfully seized pursuant to an arrest without a
warrant by an Iowa policeman in Nebraska. The
Supreme Court of Nebraska reversed and re-
manded, holding that since the Iowa policeman's
arrest and search of defendant in Nebraska did not
result from "fresh pursuit" of defendant for a
crime believed to have been committed by him in
Iowa, the warrantless arrest and unreasonable
search and seizure violated defendant's rights
under the United States Constitution and under
Nebraska law; and consequently the trial court
should have granted defendant's motion to sup-
press.
Arrest, Search and Seizure-State v. Michaels,
374 P.2d 989 (Wash. 1962). Defendant was con-
victed of illegal possession of gambling devices. On
appeal, defendant contended that the trial court
erroneously denied his motions to suppress evi-
dence obtained through illegal search and seizure.
The Supreme Court of Washington reversed and
remanded, holding that since defendant was in his
wife's car with her permission at the time of the
arrest and search, he had standing to complain
that his constitutional rights had been violated by
an unlawful seizure from the car, by authority of
Jones v. United Slates, 362 U.S. 257 (1960); and
that where police officers, who had been alerted to
look for the car in which defendant was riding but
lacked probable cause to arrest defendant, arrested
him for failing to signal for a left turn, the arrest
was a mere pretext for searching the car; and inas-
much as the ensuing search was neither for evi-
dence of the crime of failing to signal nor for tools
aiding in defendant's escape, it was not incident to
the arrest and consequently was unlawful.
Assault-Cominznwealll v. Slaney, 185 N.E.2d
919 (Mass. 1962). Having waived trial by jury,
defendant was convicted of assault and battery by
the trial court. On appeal, defendant contended
that the trial court erred in refusing to find him
not guilty of assault as a matter of law in the ab-
sence of sufficient proof of the essential element of
fear on the part of the alleged victim. The Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts affirmed, holding
that whether or not the evidence supported the
judge's specific finding of such fear was immaterial,
since fear by the victim need not be proved to
establish the crime of assault, inasmuch as the
1963]
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purpose of criminal law-preservation of the
public peace-would best be served by determin-
ing guilt in the case of assault entirely upon what
a defendant does rather than upon what a victim
apprehends.
Civil Defense-State v. Congdon, 185 A.2d 21
(N.J. Super. 1962). See Police Power, infra.
Comment on Failure to Testify-DeLuna v.
United States, 308 F.2d 140 (5th Cir. 1962). See
Self-Incrimination, infra.
Comment on Failure to Testify--Chatman v.
State, 145 So. 2d 707 (Miss. 1962). Defendant was
convicted of rape. On appeal, defendant contended
that the trial court's overruling of his objection to
the district attorney's comment on defendant's
failure to testify and its subsequent failure to de-
clare a mistrial on that ground constituted re-
versible error. The Supreme Court of Mississippi
reversed and remanded, holding that where there
was no evidence that anyone other than the
prosecutrix and defendant were present when the
alleged rape occurred, the district attorney's
remark in his closing argument that the evidence
against defendant was undisputed amounted to
improper comment on defendant's failure to
testify.
Concealing Stolen Property-People v. Tatum,
25 Cal. Rptr. 832 (Dist. Ct. App. 1962). After
having been acquitted on a charge of stealing a
house trailer, defendant was convicted of know-
ingly concealing it. On appeal, defendant con-
tended that the trial court erred in giving an
instruction under which the jury could find
defendant guilty of concealing property which he
himself had stolen. The District Court of Appeal
reversed, holding that CAL. PEN. CODE. §496(1),
under which defendant was convicted, was directed
not at thieves themselves but at those who know-
ingly deal with thieves and stolen goods, since
theft necessarily involves initial concealment, and
hence only if the facts indicated a complete di-
vorcement of the concealment charged from the
initial concealment by a thief of property stolen
by him could that thief be convicted of violating
§496(1); and consequently, in absence of evidence
of concealment by defendant independent of that
involved in the theft, the instruction complained
of was incorrect, and defendant's conviction must
be reversed. The Court noted that, irrespective of
the construction given §496(1), §654, which bars
prosecution under one of several provisions appli-
cable to a single act after a defendant has been
acquitted under another such provision with re-
gard to that act, would prevent defendant's con-
viction for immediate concealment of the stolen
property.
Confessions-Cleary v. Bolger, 83 Sup. Ct. 385
(1963). The District Court enjoined petitioner, a
state waterfront detective, from testifying against
respondent in state criminal proceedings regarding
statements made by respondent while illegally de-
tained by federal officers with whom petitioner
had cooperated, Bolger v. United States, 189 F.
Supp. 237 (S.D.N.Y. 1960), abstracted at 52 J.
CR~m. L., C. & P.S. 425 (1961), and the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed, Bolger v.
Cleary, 293 F.2d 368 (2d Cir. 1961), abstracted at
53 J. CRIM. L., C. & P.S. 66 (1962). On certiorari,
petitioner contended that the injunction interfered
with the state's right to enforce independently its
criminal law. In an opinion written by Mr. Justice
Harlan, the United States Supreme Court reversed,
holding that Rea v. United States, 350 U.S. 214
(1956), did not support the courts below because
its rationale was not applicable to state officers;
and that even if the injunction as to the federal
officers (not here in issue) were valid pursuant to
federal court supervisory power over such officers
as authorized by Rea, the injunction against
petitioner could not be upheld as necessary to
make that against the federal officers effective,
where petitioner was merely a witness to and did
not participate in their illegal conduct, was not
used by them as a shield to avoid federal require-
ments, and did not gain the information with re-
gard to which he was enjoined in violation of a
federal court order, since, absent the above factors
(the presence of which, the opinion indicates,
might compel a different result), upholding the in-
junction would constitute a "direct intrusion in
state processes" which "does not comport with
proper federal-state relationships." Mr. Justice
Goldberg, concurring specially, did not reach the
question of applicability of Rea to non-federal
officers, stating that since recent New York state
cases construing and applying Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U.S. 643, abstracted at 52 J. CRns. L., C. & P.S.
292 (1961), strongly indicated that New York
courts would exclude the evidence covered by the
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injunction, its issuance was unnecessary. Justices
Douglas, Brennan and Warren dissented.
Confessions-Wong Sun v. United States, 83
Sup. Ct. 407 (1963). Petitioners were convicted of
illegal transportation and concealment of narcotics,
and the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
affirmed, Wong Sun v. United States, 288 F.2d 366
(9th Cir.), abstracted at 52 J. CRm. L., C. &
P.S. 295 (1961). On certiorari, petitioners con-
tended that confessions made pursuant to their
illegal arrests and evidence discovered by virtue
of information contained in their pre-confession
statements were erroneously admitted against
them in violation of their Fourth Amendment
rights. The United States Supreme Court, per
Brennan, J., reversed and remanded, holding that,
as had been found by the Court of Appeals, the
warrantless arrests complained of were illegal for
lack of probable cause; that petitioner Toy's state-
ments were suppressible as "fruits" of the unlawful
arrest as having resulted therefrom notwithstand-
ing their verbal, intangible nature, since both the
holding in Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505,
abstracted at 52 J. CRm. L., C. & P.S. 300 (1961),
expanding the Fourth Amendment's protection to
verbal statements as well as to "papers and
effects," and the policies underlying the exclusion-
ary rule, abrogated any heretofore recognized dis-
tinction between verbal as opposed to tangible
"fruits" of illegal conduct by federal officers for
purposes of exclusion; and that although petitioner
Wong Sun's statement was not the fruit of his
illegal arrest, his conviction too must be reversed,
since the court below may have improperly
considered, as requisite corroboration for the state-
ment, Toy's statement to the extent that it im-
plicated Wong Sun, inasmuch as post-arrest extra-
judicial declarations may not be used at the trial
against the declarant's co-defendant. The majority
opinion treats the issue of validity of the arrests
in great detail, shedding much light on the Court's
current attitude toward the requirements for
probable cause. Mr. Justice Douglas concurred,
stating that even if probable cause were found, the
arrests would be invalid for failure to obtain a
warrant where there was time to do so. Mr.
Justice Clark dissented in an opinion in which
justices Harlan, Stewart and White joined, finding
probable cause for valid arrests without warrants
under the facts of the case.
Crime by Telephone-State v. Protopapas, 184
A.2d 558 (Conn. Cir. 1962); State v. Robinson, 184
A.2d 188 (Conn. Cir. 1962). The Appellate Divi-
sion of the Circuit Court of Connecticut recently
decided two cases involving the criminality of
threatening and obscene communications by tele-
phone. In State v. Protopapas, defendant made
numerous telephone calls to various persons in
which she used abusive, indecent and threatening
language. The Court affirmed her conviction of
breach of the peace under CoNr. GEN. STAT. REv.
§53-174 (1958), holding that "peace" referred to
that of individuals as well as that of the general
public, and hence a finding that the public repose
was disturbed by defendant's conduct was not
requisite to her conviction. The Court in State v.
Robinson set aside the judgment finding defendant
guilty of disorderly conduct and remanded with
direction to render a judgment of not guilty, hold-
ing that obscene phone calls made by defendant
from his own home to the homes of three female
complainants did not constitute disorderly con-
duct under Cotter. GEN. STAT. REv. §53-175
(1958), since the statute's proscription of "an-
noyance or interference with any person in any
place" extended only to any public place.
Cruel and Unusual Punishment-State v.
Bridges, 360 S.W.2d 648 (Mo. 1962). Defendant
was convicted of having become addicted to a
narcotic drug. On appeal, defendant contended
that he was imprisoned for being afflicted with the
disease of narcotic addiction in violation of
the Eighth Amendment's ban against cruel and
unusual punishment, applicable to the states
through the Fourteenth Amendment's due process
clause. On authority of Robinsm v. California, 370
U.S. 660, abstracted at 53 J. CuRmm. L., C. & P.S.
492 (1962), the Supreme Court of Missouri re-
versed, holding that the portion of the statute
[Mo. REv. STAT. §195.020 (1959)] making it a
crime "to be or become addicted to any narcotic
drug" was unconstitutional as inflicting cruel and
unusual punishment. The Court noted that "be-
coming an addict"-of which defendant was con-
victed-was not legally distinguishable from
"being an addict"-which was involved in Robin-
sm-since "being" is necessarily preceded by
"becoming"; and that the state legislature in-
tended, by use of the phrase "being or becoming,"
to make the status of addiction a criminal offense.
1963]
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Derivative Evidence-Wong Sun v. United
States, 83 Sup. Ct. 407 (1963). See Confessions,
supra.
Double Jeopardy-People v. Tatum, 25 Cal.
Rptr. 832 (Dist. Ct. App. 1962). See Concealing
Stolen Property, supra.
Due Process-People v. Clemvwns, 25 Cal.
Rptr. 467 (Dist. Ct. App. 1962). Defendant was
convicted of administering narcotics to a minor.
On appeal, defendant contended that he was denied
due process when the trial court, through use of
its contempt power, coerced the testimony of the
minor witness for the prosecution. The District
Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that since coer-
cion of the witness was an issue only between
that witness and the state, defendant lacked
standing to complain.
Freedom of Religion-State v. Congdon, 185
A.2d 21 (N.J. Super. 1962). See Police Power,
infra.
Gambling-In re Allen, 27 Cal. Rptr. 168
(1962). Petitioner was convicted of permitting a
game of chance to be played in her home for money
in violation of a Los Angeles County ordinance.
On original petition for writ of habeas corpus,
petitioner contended that bridge is a game of skill
rather than of chance, and hence that the conduct
with which she was charged failed to constitute an
offense. The Supreme Court of California granted
the writ and discharged petitioner from custody,
holding that the test of whether a game is one of
chance or skill is not whether it contains an ele-
ment of one or the other but rather which factor
is the dominant determinant of the result of the
game; and that the predominant element in bridge
is skill even though the game does involve some
chance. The Court cited, inter alia, texts on bridge
by Goren and Culbertson, noting that the existence
of such a large amount of literature designed to
increase the skill of bridge players was a persua-
sive indication favoring the holding.
Guilt by Association-Ball v. State, 375 P.2d
340 (Okla. Crim. App. 1962). See Right to a Fair
Trial, infra.
Habeas Corpus-Jones v. Cunningham, 83 Sup.
Ct. 373 (1963). Petitioner was convicted as a
third offender by a Virginia state court of an
offense requiring imprisonment in the state peni-
tentiary. The District Court dismissed a petition
for habeas corpus, and shortly before his appeal
was argued before the Fourth Circuit, petitioner
was paroled by the Virginia Parole Board. The
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit dismissed
the case as moot, since petitioner was no longer in
the custody of respondent Superintendent of the
Virginia State Penitentiary, and refused to permit
petitioner to add as respondents members of the
Virginia Parole Board, because they lacked physi-
cal custody of petitioner. On certiorari, petitioner
contended that as a parolee, he was "in custody"
for purposes of invoking federal habeas corpus
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §2241 (1958). The
United States Supreme Court, per Mr. Justice
Black, unanimously reversed and remanded to the
Court of Appeals with directions to grant peti-
tioner's motion to add the members of the parole
board as respondents and to proceed to a decision
on the merits, holding that although petitioner's
parole released him from immediate physical im-
prisonment, it nevertheless constituted "custody"
within the meaning of the habeas corpus statute,
inasmuch as conditions imposed on petitioner by
the terms of his parole [e.g., petitioner must, inter
alia, live in a specified house, receive permission
to drive a car, be temperate, and report periodi-
cally to his parole officer], regardless of the impor-
tance of such restrictions to the rehabilitative
process, significantly confined petitioner and re-
strained his liberty "to do those things which in
this country free men are entitled to do."
Habeas Corpus-Thomas v. Morrow, 361 S.W.2d
105 (Ky. 1962). See Insanity, infra.
Habitual Criminal Acts-United States ex rel.
Pennise v. Fay, 210 F. Supp. 277 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
See Right to Counsel, infra.
Improper Conduct by Defense Counsel-De-
Luna v. United States, 308 F.2d 140 (5th Cir. 1962).
See Self-Incrimination, infra.
Improper Conduct by Defense Counsel-State
v. Reddick, 184 A.2d 652 (N.J. Super. 1962). After
defendant's first trial for robbery resulted in a
mistrial due to the jury's failure to agree, defendant
was retried and convicted. On appeal, defendant
contended that his own counsel's remarks in sum-
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mation were so prejudicial that he was denied a
fair trial. The Appellate Division of the New
Jersey Superior Court reversed and ordered a new
trial, holding that where defendant's counsel, in
an attempt to persuade the jury that defendant
was too accomplished and sophisticated a criminal
to indulge in the poorly planned robbery with
which he was charged, characterized him as one
who was accustomed to mugging women, "your
wives and mine, our sisters," and leaving them to
bleed to death, fundamental justice demanded
that defendant be afforded a new trial in light of
the certain enormity of the impact of these com-
ments, since the principle that a defendant is
bound by his counsel's trial tactics would not be
applied where defendant's right to a fair trial
would otherwise be abrogated.
Improper Conduct by Prosecutor-Dunn v.
United States, 307 F.2d 883 (5th Cir. 1962). De-
fendant, then Mayor of Baxley, Ga., was convicted
of wrongfully attempting to evade federal income
tax laws under §7201 of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1954. On appeal, defendant contended
that the District Court erred in failing to grant his
motions for mistrial predicated on prejudicial
statements by the United States Attorney. The
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed
and remanded, holding that where in his opening
statement the prosecutor asserted, "This case is
replete with fraud and is one of the most flagrant
cases we have ever tried in [this district]," and
made a dosing argument to the effect that the un-
reported funds came from "kickbacks" paid by
contractors to defendant as Mayor and that all
politicians take such "kickbacks", both instances
were highly prejudicial; and the district court
should have granted defendant's motions for mis-
trial, since the court's cautionary instructions that
the jury should disregard the statements could not
have cured the prejudice.
Insanity-Thonmas v. Morrow, 361 S.W.2d 105
(Ky. 1962). Petitioner was convicted of robbery,
and the Circuit Court granted habeas corpus,
ordering his release from custody. On appeal by
the Commonwealth, petitioner contended that the
judgment of conviction was void due to his lack of
mental capacity to plead to the indictment. The
Court of Appeals of Kentucky affirmed, holding
that since petitioner was mentally incompetent at
the time of arraignment and sentence, the judg-
ment of conviction was void, and habeas corpus
would lie to correct the wrong. The Court relied
exclusively on a federal court of appeals case,
Broadus v. Lowry, 245 F.2d 304 (6th Cir. 1957),
there apparently being no Kentucky precedent.
Insanity-State v. White, 374 P.2d 942 (Wash.
1962). Defendant was convicted of first and
second degree murder. On appeal, defendant con-
tended that the trial court erred in instructing the
jury in terms of the M'Naghten rules of criminal
responsibility instead of giving a requested instruc-
tion incorporating the American Law Institute
standard; and that a psychiatrist should have
been allowed to testify as to statements made by
defendant while under the influence of truth serum.
Examining and rejecting not only the ALI stand-
ard urged by defendant but also the Durham rule,
the Supreme Court of Washington affirmed,
holding that when the M'Naghten rules are used,
all persons who might possibly be deterred, by the
thought of punishment, from committing crimes are
included within the sanctions of the criminal law,
and consequently the rules should be retained in
Washington since they serve the deterrent purpose
of criminal jurisprudence far more effectively than
do the ALI or Durham rules, which relieve from
criminal responsibility those persons whose voli-
tion has been impaired by mental disease or defect;
and, analogizing the reliability of truth serum
evidence to that of evidence resulting from poly-
graph tests and hypnosis, that the trial court did
not abuse its discretion in refusing to admit the
psychiatrist's proffered testimony regarding state-
ments defendant made while under the influence
of truth serum, even though the evidence was
sought to be admitted solely for the purpose of
allowing the jury to understand the basis for the
psychiatrist's expert opinion concerning de-
fendant's sanity. The Court noted that the truth
serum issue was one of first impression in Washing-
ton. Though agreeing that the M'Naghten test
should be retained as the standard of criminal
responsibility, Judge Hill concurred specially,
wishing to allow juries in capital cases to hear
evidence concerning volition, not as pertaining to
guilt or innocence, but in determining punishment.
Three members of the seven judge Court dissented,
advancing the argument that persons who, due to
impairment of volition or the capacity of free will,
would be absolved of culpability under the ALI
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test will not, because of that very impairment, be
deterred by the possibility of punishment.
Juvenile Proceedings-Green v. United States,
308 F.2d 303 (D.C. Cir. 1962). See Right to a Fair
Trial, infra.
Narcotics-State v. Bridges, 360 S.W.2d 648
(Mo. 1962). See Cruel and Unusual Punishment,
supra.
Parole-Jones v. Cunningham, 83 Sup. Ct. 373
(1962). See Habeas Corpus, supra.
Parole-People ex rel. Kitbala v. Kinney, 185
N.E.2d 337 (Ill. 1962). Petitioner was convicted
of murder in 1933 and was sentenced to 100 years
imprisonment. On petition for mandamus to re-
quire the Parole Board to consider his application
for parole, petitioner contended that the proviso
to the Sentence and Parole Act, ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 38, par. 801 (1961), making all persons eligible
for parole after serving 20 years, applied to persons
sentenced prior to its effective date, January 1,
1962, and that the previous requirement that a
prisoner serve one-third of his sentence before
becoming eligible for parole no longer applied. The
Supreme Court of Illinois issued the writ, holding
that since parole is an act of clemency and grace,
it is not within the judicial function and the legisla-
ture has power both to change its terms and condi-
tions and to make such changes immediately
effective regardless of the date of sentencing; and
inasmuch as the proviso by its terms applied to
"'every person sentenced to the penitentiary," and
failure to apply the proviso retroactively would
prevent the legislative policy therein expressed
from taking effect for 20 years, the proviso would
be applied to persons such as the petitioner who
were sentenced prior to the effective date of the
new legislation.
Police Power-State v. Congdon, 185 A.2d 21
(N.J. Super. 1962). Defendant students were con-
victed of being disorderly persons under a statute
which deems anyone who refuses to obey civil
defense orders a disorderly person. On appeal,
defendants contended that their convictions vio-
lated their First Amendment right to religious
freedom, inasmuch as their refusal to take cover
during "Operation Alert 1961," a state-wide civil
defense drill, was motivated by their religious
beliefs. The Appellate Division of the Superior
Court of New Jersey affirmed, holding that publica-
tions distributed by the anti-war organization of
which defendants were members evidenced that
political, philosophical or practical views, rather
than religious beliefs, underlay defendants' deci-
sion to disobey the civil defense orders; but that
even if defendants had been expressing valid
religious beliefs, their exercise of practices pursuant
thereto was properly subjected to reasonable regu-
lation by the state in light of the public welfare.
Rape-State v. Croteau, 184 A.2d 683 (Me. 1962);
Commonwealth v. Maroney, 186 A.2d 864 (Pa.
Super. 1962). Two courts have recently considered
the issue of sufficiency of proof of penetration in a
prosecution for rape, reaching results which,
though different, seem compatible in view of the
facts involved. In State v. Croteau, the Supreme
Court of Maine sustained defendant's appeal and
granted a new trial for failure of proof of penetra-
tion, where the only evidence of this element of
the crime consisted of the testimony of prosecutrix
(defendant's daughter) that defendant had "sex
relations" with her and that she had experienced
"awful pain." The Court held that "sex relations"
embraced a much wider sphere of activity than
did "sexual intercourse" (synonymous with "camal
knowledge"), which involves penetration and must
be proved to establish the crime of rape; and that
due to lack of evidence as to the precise location
of prosecutrix' "awful pain" and as to its cause,
such pain was consistent with brutal sex relations
either with or without the requisite carnal knowl-
edge. The Superior Court of Pennsylvania, in
Commonwealth v. Maroney, affirmed the lower
court's dismissal of petitioner's application for
writ of habeas corpus where prosecutrix stated,
"he had intercourse with me," and that she had
experienced pain caused by such intercourse, since
the term "intercourse" had a common, generally
understood meaning which included the necessary
element of penetration.
Right to a Fair Trial-Green v. United States,
308 F.2d 303 (D.C. Cir. 1962). Defendant, aged
17, was convicted of robbery. On appeal, defendant
contended that receipt in evidence of the Juvenile
Court's waiver of jurisdiction constituted reversi-
ble error. The Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit reversed and remanded with
directions to determine whether the Juvenile Court
[Vol. 54
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made a full investigation prior to waiving jurisdic-
tion, holding that since the waiver of jurisdiction
on its face constituted, inter alia, a judicial finding
of probable cause that defendant was guilty, his
substantial rights were infringed by admitting it
in evidence and by allowing it to be sent to the
jury room, inasmuch as it is likely that the jury
would draw the inference that a judicial officer had
already concluded that defendant was, at least,
probably guilty; and since utilization of the waiver
was plain error affecting defendant's substantial
rights, FED. R. Cnn=. P. 52(b) rendered it cogniza-
ble on appeal even though no objection was made
at the trial.
Right to a Fair Trial-State v. Redidick, 184 A.2d
652 (N.J. Super. 1962). See Improper Conduct by
Defense Counsel, supra.
Right to a Fair Trial-Ball v. State, 375 P.2d 340
(Okla. Crim. App. 1962). Defendant was convicted
of second degree burglary. On appeal, defendant
contended that where the trial court permitted
the state, over her objections, to adduce incom-
petent and prejudicial testimony, defendant was
denied a fair and impartial trial. The Court of
Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma reversed and
remanded, holding that testimony elicited from
defendant on cross-examination regarding details
of her husband's present prison sentence and past
criminal record had no bearing on any issue in the
case, and that permitting such cross-examination
was prejudicial and constituted reversible error,
since it tended to depict defendant as a person
condemned by association.
Right to Counsel--Gideon v. Wainwright, 83
Sup. Ct. 792 (1963). After petitioner was convicted
in a Florida state court of the felony of breaking
and entering with intent to commit a misdemeanor,
the Florida Supreme Court denied his petition for
habeas corpus. On certiorari, petitioner contended
that the trial court's refusal to appoint counsel at
his request constituted denial of a fair trial in
violation of Fourteenth Amendment due process.
Overruling Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942), the
United States Supreme Court unanimously re-
versed, holding that the right to counsel guaranteed
by the Sixth Amendment is applicable to the states
through the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, since representation by counsel is
fundamental and essential to a fair trial. Noting
that "in our adversary system of criminal justice,
any person haled into court, who is too poor to
hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless
counsel is provided for him," the Court rejected
the Betts v. Brady qualification of right to counsel
as applied to the states-that, although the state
must always provide counsel in capital cases, it
must do so in non-capital cases only where failure
to do so would amount to fundamental unfairness-
stating that Betts constituted an anomalous devia-
tion from pre-1942 cases enunciating concepts of
Fourteenth Amendment due process. The majority
opinion was written by Mr. Justice Black; Harlan,
Douglas and Clark, JJ., concurred in separate
opinions. Mr. justice Harlan noted that the instant
decision did not affect all criminal cases, but only
those involving substantial prison sentences. While
Florida and two other states sought affirmance of
petitioner's conviction, 22 states filed amicus
curiae briefs, urging that Betts v. Brady be overruled.
See also Douglas v. California, 83 Sup. Ct. 814
(1963), where the Court (7-2) held that right to
counsel on appeal from a state criminal conviction
is absolute, striking down the California rule of
criminal procedure providing that counsel be pro-
vided on appeal only if, in the appellate court's
opinion, such appointment would be helpful to the
defendant or the court.
Right to Counsel-United States ex rel. Pennise
v. Fay, 210 F. Supp. 277 (S.D.N.Y. 1962). Peti-
tioner was convicted in 1952 of first degree man-
slaughter by a New York state court, and was
sentenced as a second felony offender. On applica-
tion for writ of habeas corpus, petitioner contended
that he was under illegal detention, since his first
conviction, on which the sentence as a second
felony offender was predicated, was obtained in
violation of his right to counsel. The District
Court granted the writ and remanded petitioner
to custody of respondent warden pending prompt
resentencing of petitioner as a first felony offender
upon the 1952 conviction, holding that where
petitioner, then aged 19 and unfamiliar with legal
proceedings, was tried without counsel and con-
victed of the crime against nature in 1941 by an
Idaho state court without having been advised
of his right to counsel, this conviction (of which
defendant had been unconditionally pardoned in
1941 by the Governor of Idaho) was obtained in
violation of due process, since under the circum-
stances denial of counsel constituted denial of
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fundamental fairness, even though petitioner was
neither physically nor mentally handicapped and
even though there was no claim that the charges
or possible defenses to the Idaho prosecution were
unduly complex; and consequently the Idaho
conviction could not be used by the New York
state court for the purpose of increasing petitioner's
punishment as a second offender.
Scientific Evidence-Fingerprints-People v.
Abner, 25 Cal. Rptr. 882 (Dist. Ct. App. 1962).
Having waived jury trial, defendant was convicted
by the trial court of rape, assault with intent to
commit rape, oral copulation, five counts of bur-
glary, and three counts of robbery. On appeal,
defendant contended that the fingerprint expert's
inability to enumerate 12 points of similarity be-
tween defendant's fingerprints and those found at
the scenes of the crimes denied defendant the right
to cross-examination and rendered proof of his
identification insufficient. The District Court of
Appeal affirmed, holding that since the fingerprint
expert's failure to answer questions on cross-
examination pertaining to the basis for his opinion
as to his fingerprint identification of defendant
resulted from inability to recall the points of simi-
larity rather than from refusal to answer, defendant
was not deprived of his right to cross-examine,
especially since defendant made no request that
the expert study the fingerprints again and return
for further cross-examination; that the expert's
inability to enumerate the 12 points of similarity
went only to the weight of his testimony; and that
even if the identification of defendant by one of
his alleged victims was weak, the fingerprint ex-
pert's identification was sufficient to support the
trial court's finding. The Court noted that "finger-
prints ... are the strongest evidence of identity."
Scientific Evidence-Lie Detector Evidence-
State v. Emory, 375 P.2d 585 (Kan. 1962); State
v. Mottram, 184 A.2d 225 (Me. 1962). The highest
courts of two states have recently considered the
admissibility of evidence of refusal to take a lie
detector test. In State v. Emory, the Supreme Court
of Kansas reversed defendant's conviction and
granted a new trial where testimony regarding his
refusal to take a polygraph test had been admitted
over his objection. The Court held that this evi-
dence was inadmissible since results of such tests
are inadmissible, and that erroneous admission of
the evidence effectively deprived defendant of a
fair trial by precluding the jury from giving fair
consideration to his alibi defense. The Supreme
judicial Court of Maine took a more comprehen-
sive view of the issue in State v. Mottram, where the
defendant complained of the trial court's failure
to admit evidence that a key witness for the state
had refused to take a lie detector test. Noting by
way of dictum that evidence of such refusal would
be admissible as bearing on the credibility of a
witness or consciousness of guilt of a defendant if
the proponent laid a proper foundation by showing
that the witness or defendant believed that the
test was trustworthy or dependable, the Court
overruled defendant's exceptions and dismissed
the appeal, since such a foundation had not been
laid in the instant case.
Scientific Evidence-Truth Serum-State v.
White, 347 P.2d 942 (Wash. 1962). See Insanity,
supra.
Search and Seizure-People v. Norton, 25 Cal.
Rptr. 676 (Dist. Ct. App. 1962). Cf. Bielicki v.
Superior Court, 21 Cal. Rptr. 552 (1962), and Britt
v. Superior Court, 24 Cal. Rptr. 849 (1962), ab-
stracted at 54 J. Cnm. L., C. & P.S. 81, 82 (1963).
Defendant was convicted of violating CAL. PEN.
CODE §288a. On appeal, defendant contended that
the evidence upon which he was convicted was
obtained by an illegal search. The District Court
of Appeal affirmed, holding that where defendant,
while committing the unlawful act in a doorless
toilet stall of the men's room of a theater, was seen
through "observation holes" in a marble partition
by a police officer who had secreted himself behind
the partition, the officer's conduct not only was
not unlawful but was not a search at all, since
defendant's activities could have been seen by any
member of the public who happened to enter the
restroom. The Court distinguished the instant case
from Bielicki, supra, on the ground that the factual
essence of the Bielicki case was the privacy of the
toilet stall wherein petitioners were observed by
the police, noting that the California Supreme
Court in condemning the secret observation stated
that no member of the public could have seen the
activities. The District Court of Appeal, which
decided Norton on October 31, failed to mention
and apparently was unaware of the Britt case,
decided by the Supreme Court of California on
October 2, holding on authority of Bielicki that
clandestine observation by police of petitioner's
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act was unlawful, even though the act could have
been visible to any member of the public entering
the men's room; thus, Brit would seem to be con-
trolling in the instant case.
Search and Seizure--People v. Tahtinen, 26 Cal.
Rptr. 864 (Dist. Ct. App. 1962); People v. Dicken-
son, 26 Cal. Rptr. 601 (Dist. Ct. App. 1962);
People v. Erickson, 26 Cal. Rptr. 546 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1962). Two districts of the District Court of
Appeal of California have recently decided three
cases concerning the legality of forcible removal of
narcotics from the mouth or throat of a defendant,
reaching divergent results. In the Tahtinen case,
Division 1 of the Second District held that where
arresting officers who were violently resisted by
defendant held defendant's head forward and
downward to prevent him from swallowing a
package which they reasonably believed contained
heroin, and did not choke defendant, who even-
tually spit out the package, their conduct was
lawful, since in light of defendant's violence they
did not use unreasonable force and because de-
fendant "had no constitutional right to swallow...
the evidence of his crime." The Fourth District, in
People v. Dickinson, held that where following a
lawful arrest without a warrant, police officers
first held defendant's Adam's apple to keep him
from swallowing a rubber contraceptive filled with
heroin and then, believing him to be in danger of
choking to death when he began to gag and turn
blue in his attempt to swallow it, removed the
contraceptive from his throat, the officers' conduct
was reasonable and lawful. The Courts in both
Tahtinen and Dickenson noted that the officers'
acts were not at all comparable to the conduct
which the United States Supreme Court found
brutal and shocking in Rochin v. California, 342
U.S. 165 (1952). Division 4 of the Second District
reached the opposite result on facts very similar
to those of the cases discussed above in People v.
Erickson, where a police officer choked defendant
until he spit out a capsule of heroin. The Court
reversed defendant's conviction even though the
issue of the legality of the seizure had not been
raised prior to appeal, indicating that the issue
was not how hard an officer might choke a de-
fendant but whether he could choke him at all.
While in Erickson the officer's conduct with regard
to defendant was characterized as "choking", that
part of the officer's testimony reproduced in the
opinion implies that it was the same type of
Adam's-apple-holding that was condoned in Dick-
enson.
Search and Seizure--Castaneda v. Superior
Court, 26 Cal. Rptr. 364 (Dist. Ct. App. 1962).
Petitioner sought prohibition to restrain the trial
court from proceeding against him on an informa-
tion charging him with possession of a narcotic,
contending that evidence to be used against him
was obtained by means of an unlawful search and
seizure, and that the trial court erred in excluding
a certified copy of a United States District Court
order suppressing, in a federal prosecution, identi-
cal evidence obtained by the same search and
seizure. The District Court of Appeal denied the
writ, holding that California courts are not bound
by decisions of lower federal courts, even on due
process questions; and since Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U.S. 643, abstracted at 52 J. CnR. L., C. & P.S.
292 (1961), did not preclude the states from ad-
judicating the reasonableness of searches and
seizures, the trial court was correct in finding that
petitioner had consented to the search complained
of in view of his failure to object at the time of the
search, despite the federal court's ruling.
Search and Seizure-State v. Doyle, 186 A.2d
499 (N.J. Super. 1962). Defendants were convicted
of criminal abortion. On appeal, defendants con-
tended that evidence obtained by unlawful search
and seizure was erroneously used against them. The
Appellate Division of the New Jersey Superior
Court affirmed, holding that Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U.S. 643, abstracted at 52 J. CnR. L., C. & P.S.
292 (1961), applied retroactively even if no objec-
tion to admission of the evidence was made before
or during trial, since such objection was futile in
New Jersey prior to the Mapp decision; but that
defendants' convictions would nonetheless be
affirmed, since even if the evidence in question
was unlawfully obtained, its admission constituted
harmless error, inasmuch as the evidence was
merely cumulative and was not "of a stature suffi-
cient to have influenced the result...."
Search and Seizure-Commonwealth v. One 1958
Plymouth Sedan, 186 A.2d 52 (Pa. Super. 1962).
The Quarter Sessions Court of Philadelphia County
dismissed the Commonwealth's petition for forfei-
ture of a car used for illegal transportation of
non-tax paid liquor. On appeal by the Common-
wealth, the owner of the car contended that the
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liquor had been discovered in the car by unreason-
able search and seizure. The Superior Court of
Pennsylvania reversed and ordered forfeiture,
holding that where the seizing officers had reason
to believe that a car answering the description of
the car in question was being used for illegal trans-
portation of liquor from New Jersey to Pennsyl-
vania, and the car seized was "quite low in the
rear," stopping and searching the car was reason-
able under all the circumstances, particularly since
it took place immediately after the officers saw the
car enter Pennsylvania from New Jersey. The
Court apparently based its decision not on a finding
of probable cause but on the principle that "a
state should have the right to stop a traveler com-
ing into the state and to search his belongings to
ascertain whether he is bringing into the state any
property upon which a state tax is due." Three of
the seven judges dissented, stating that the major-
ity opinion encroached upon the freedom to travel
between states without visa or barrier.
Search and Seizure-Commonwealth v. Mancini,
184 A.2d 279 (Pa. Super. 1962). Petitioner was
convicted of burglary on June 19, 1961. On appeal
from the trial court's denial of his post-conviction
petition to quash search warrants and suppress
evidence seized thereunder, petitioner contended
that the warrants were invalid and that Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, abstracted at 52 J. CRw. L.,
C. &. P.S. 292 (1961), decided on the very same
day on which petitioner was convicted, required
suppression of the evidence. The Superior Court
of Pennsylvania affirmed, holding that where
nothing in the record indicated that the apparently
lawful warrants were invalid and the question of
legality of the search was not raised before or
during trial, Mapp would not apply. By way of
dictum, the Court added: "(T]he sudden change
of the law by the Supreme Court of the United
States as to the exclusionary rule is a disturbing
exercise of judicial power and should not have
retroactive effect with respect to criminal proceed-
ings in this Commonwealth ......
Search and Seizure-Holt v. State, 117 N.W.2d
626 (Wis. 1962). Defendant was convicted of first
degree murder for placing her newborn child in a
furnace. On appeal, defendant contended that
police officers gained admittance to her home and
searched it in violation of her constitutional rights.
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin affirmed, holding
that since the officers were permitted to enter the
home by defendant's husband, who had authority
to admit persons, defendant's constitutional rights
were not infringed by the officers' entry; and since
defendant thereafter allowed the officers to search
the premises, voluntarily answered their questions
and complied with their requests, and stated that
they "treated her courteously," the trial court's
finding that defendant consented to the search
was reasonable under all the circumstances. One
judge dissented, stating that defendant's acts were
as consistent with peaceful submission to officers
of the law as with voluntary consent to the search.
Self-Incrimination-DeLima v. United States,
308 F.2d 140 (5th Cir. 1962). Defendant was con-
victed of narcotics violations. On appeal, defendant
contended that he was denied a fair trial when the
District Court, over objection, permitted his co-
defendant's counsel to comment on defendant's
failure to testify. Noting that it found no case
directly in point, the Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded, holding
that although the repeated references of co-
defendant's counsel to defendant's failure to
testify (e.g., that co-defendant "was honest enough
and had courage enough to take the stand" while
"you haven't heard a word from [defendant]) were
justified, considering the case from co-defendant's
point of view, since under the circumstances the
duty of co-defendant's counsel to his client required
the drawing of such inferences, the references in
context of the trial constituted a violation of the
Fifth Amendment and of 18 U.S.C. §3481 (1958)
(providing that a defendant may be a witness,
but that failure to do so "shall not create any
presumption against him") since, even though
the comments were not made by any agent of the
federal government, the district judge's refusal to
disapprove the attorney's conduct and to take
steps to prevent defendant from being penalized
for relying on his constitutional right to remain
silent amounted to prohibited federal participation
in or sanction of the comments. The majority
opinion, written by Circuit judge Wisdom, con-
tains a comprehensive study of the development
of the Fifth Amendment privilege. An alternative
holding seems to be that the comment rendered
defendant's trial unfair because of its effect upon
the jury, rather than because federal action was
found. Judge Bell concurred specially, stating that
the right of a defendant, recognized by the major-
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ity, to comment on his co-defendant's failure to
testify will create intolerable procedural problems;
e.g., it will result, as a practical matter, in elimina-
tion of joint trials.
Sentencing-State ex tel. Nelson v. Ellsworth,
375 P.2d 316 (Mont. 1962). After petitioner's
conviction was reversed by the Supreme Court of
Montana, petitioner was retried and again con-
victed. On original petition for writ of mandamus
or other remedial writ directed to respondent
Warden of the State Prison and respondent State
Board of Prison Commissioners, petitioner con-
tended that he was entitled to require respondents
to allow credit on his second sentence for time
served during imprisonment pursuant to the
original conviction which had been reversed. Not-
ing that the case was one of first impression in the
state, the Supreme Court of Montana dismissed
the cause, refusing to grant relief, holding that
since MONT. REv. CODES ANN. §94-7602 (1947)
provided that the granting of a new trial places
the parties in the same position as if no trial had
occurred, §94-4717 states that imprisonment under
a judgment begins to run only upon delivery to the
prison, and §94-8003 directs respondent warden
to detain petitioner until the full second sentence
has been served, the Court was precluded by
statutory law from granting the requested relief.
Observing that petitioner's only relief would be
through commutation, pardon or parole, the Court
stated that the legislature may wish to consider
adopting a statute to cover such situations.
Sex Offenses-Reynolds v. State, 146 So. 2d 85
(Ala. 1962). Defendant was convicted of violating
ALA. STAT. tit. 14, §398 (1940), which proscribes
carnal knowledge of, or abuse in the attempt to
have carnal knowledge of, a girl under 12 years of
age. On appeal from the trial court's denial of his
motion for new trial, defendant contended that the
evidence was insufficient to support the verdict.
The Supreme Court of Alabama reversed and
remanded, holding that since "carnal knowledge"
means "sexual intercourse" and thus necessarily
involves the sexual organs of both parties, the
evidence against defendant, which showed abuse
or injury of the girl's rectum but not of her genital
or sexual organs, failed to support the charge
against him.
Sex Offenses-State v. Croteau, 184 A.2d 683
(Me. 1962); Comnonwealth v. Maroney, 186 A.2d
864 (Pa. Super. 1962). See Rape, supra.
Theft-People v. Tatum, 25 Cal. Rptr. 832 (Dist.
Ct. App. 1962). See Concealing Stolen Property,
supra.
Wiretapping-Ferguson v. United States, 307
F.2d 787 (10th Cir. 1962). Defendants were con-
victed of purchase and sale of narcotics and con-
spiracy to violate narcotics laws. On appeal,
defendants contended that recordings of telephone
conversations obtained in violation of both §605
of the Federal Communications Act of 1934 [47
U.S.C. §605 (1948)] and an Oklahoma statute
[ORTA. STAT. tit. 21, §1757 (1951)] were erroneously
admitted as evidence against them. The Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed, holding
that since one of the parties to the intercepted
telephone conversations, a special government
employee hired for the purpose of obtaining evi-
dence in this case, consented to interception and
recordation, §605 was not violated; and that
illegality of the interception under Oklahoma law
had no bearing on disposition of defendants'
appeal, since "the course of a federal criminal
prosecution cannot be controlled by state law."
Withdrawal of Plea of Guilty-Caves v. State,
147 So. 2d 632 (Miss. 1962). Defendant was con-
victed of grand larceny on his plea of guilty, and
the trial court denied his post-conviction motion
for leave to withdraw the plea and enter a plea of
not guilty. On appeal from denial of the motion
defendant contended that the trial court errone-
ously accepted the guilty plea. The Supreme Court
of Mississippi reversed and remanded, holding
that where defendant was illiterate and of ques-
tionable mental competence, the trial court's
acceptance of his plea of guilty, without first ad-
vising defendant of his basic rights and determining
that the plea was voluntary and that defendant
understood its nature and consequences, was in-
correct; and consequently the order denying de-
fendant's motion to withdraw the plea must be
reversed.
Witnesses-Coercion-People v. Clemmons, 25
Cal. Rptr. 467 (Dist. Ct. App. 1962). See Due
Process, supra.
1963]
